1) Milan Court of Appeal: on whether the constitutional principles on local public finance fall within the notion of public policy for the purposes of the recognition of foreign judgments

By judgment No. 2676/2026, published on 20 October 2026, the Milan Court of Appeal (Section I Civil) ruled, inter alia, on whether the constitutional principles on local public finance fall within the notion of (economic) public policy, in a dispute concerning the recognition of a foreign judgment relating to derivative contracts entered into by an Italian local authority.

In this regard, the Court emphasized that the notion of public policy is dynamic in nature and must therefore be assessed in the relevant historical context, taking into account not only constitutional principles and supranational sources, but also their elaboration in case-law, expressed by the so-called living law (diritto vivente).

On that premise, the Court ruled out that the constitutional principles governing local public finance (including, in particular, that of budgetary balance) concern merely the organization of territorial bodies, affirming that they may in the abstract be brought within the notion of economic public policy. To that end, the Court referred, inter alia, to judgment No. 8770/2020 of the Joint Sections of the Italian Supreme Court (the so-called Cattolica judgment), which had expressly given weight to those principles in identifying the conditions under which local authorities could in the past enter into derivative contracts.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court affirmed the principle that manifest conflict with the constitutional principles on public finance, as principles attributable to the notion of economic public policy, may in the abstract prevent the recognition in Italy of a foreign judgment.

The Court nevertheless specified that the public policy review has a purely extrinsic scope: the object of comparison must be the findings made by the foreign court (reconstructed also in the light of the reasoning and not of the operative part alone), without any possibility of a review on the merits by the Italian court.

2) Italian Supreme Court: in the event of early repayment of a loan, the reduction of the total cost of the credit also includes the commissions paid to intermediaries

By order No. 27040/2026, published on 16 October 2026, the Italian Supreme Court ruled on the reduction of the total cost of credit in the event of early repayment of a consumer credit agreement entered into before 25 July 2021, the date of entry into force of the new wording of Article 125-sexies of the Consolidated Banking Act (“TUB”).

The Italian Supreme Court recalled that the Lexitor judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) (C-383/18) established the refundability of all costs linked to the granting of the credit, whether up front or recurring, specifying that this principle must also apply to contracts preceding the reform of Article 125-sexies of the TUB, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court in judgment No. 263/2022, by reason of the binding and retroactive effect (subject to the limit of exhausted relationships) of the interpretation of European Union law provided by the CJEU.

The Italian Supreme Court therefore specified that the reduction of the total cost of the credit also includes the charges borne by the lender vis-à-vis third parties, including intermediation commissions. The fact that the bank had collected such commissions as a mere accipiens, and then paid them over to the intermediary, does not exclude their refundability, without prejudice to the bank’s possibility of taking action, where the conditions are met, against the latter.

Finally, the Court clarified that, in the case of a contract entered into before 25 July 2021, such costs must be refunded on a pro rata temporis basis, which is more favourable to the consumer than the interest curve method, because it is simpler to verify and such as to enable the consumer to know in advance the refundable amounts.

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3) Italian Supreme Court, Joint Sections: standing to be sued for obligations entered into by the judicial administrator during an anti-mafia preventive seizure depends on the capacity in which the administrator contracted with third parties

By judgment No. 26806/2026, published on 14 October 2026, the Joint Sections of the Italian Supreme Court, ruling on the question referred by the Third Section by interlocutory order No. 20991/2024, clarified who is liable for the obligations entered into during an anti-mafia preventive seizure covering, at one and the same time, all the shares and all the assets of a limited company. The case concerned supplies requested by the judicial administrator of a company subsequently confiscated, payment for which had been demanded from the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the State Property Agency (Agenzia del Demanio).

As a preliminary matter, the Joint Sections ruled out that the company can be the object of seizure as a “productive asset”, since seizure may only concern assets (i.e., the company’s shares or business assets) and not legal subjects; as a result, the State does not acquire the status of an entrepreneur with unlimited liability.

The Joint Sections then laid down the following principles of law:

• standing to be sued depends on the capacity in which the judicial administrator contracted with third parties (contemplatio domini), which is a matter of fact reserved to the court of merit:
  • if the judicial administrator contracted as “custodian and/or judicial administrator of the business assets”, liability lies with the Treasury (within the limits and in the manner laid down by law), in the event of confiscation, or with the company originally holding the assets, with its entire assets, in the event of revocation of the seizure, subject to the possibility of advances charged to the Treasury; and
  • if, on the other hand, the administrator contracted as “director (de jure or de facto) and legal representative of the company”, the company alone is liable, with its assets, and the Treasury’s liability is excluded;
• a judicial administrator authorized to continue the business may enter into obligations without further authorization only if he or she has the resources necessary to pay them; otherwise, where advances charged to the Treasury are necessary, he or she must request specific authorization from the court that ordered or manages the seizure, which assesses its appropriateness in the light of the concrete prospects of a positive and “useful” management of the seized business.

To access the decision, click here.